Why is there so little temperate talk around transsexualism?

The current top hit on the Guardian’s ‘Comment is Free’ site is this piece by Julie Burchill, which defends Suzanne Moore from charges of ‘transphobia’. I’m unimpressed by the language of the piece, and her implication that the people she is battling are academics is wide of the mark, but I recognize it as a voice of dissent against a very strongly asserted liberal position, and want to consider its position more thoughtfully, as a leftist feminist, than I’ve so far seen in the instant, reflex, super-animated, and rather boring Twitter condemnations of Burchill.

One of the most interesting ironies of the now very frequent attacks that are made, generally on Twitter, generally by people who call themselves leftists, Marxists, and gender theorists, is that they use a Latinate insult word, ‘cis’, as part of their claim that (an apparently monolithic class of) other people are privileged. I don’t accuse them of hypocrisy, since I’m sure that not all of them are privately educated, and even state-educated people like me know what ‘cis’ means without having studied Latin at school, but I’m concerned for other reasons. I see only a qualified leftism, no Marxism, and a rather confused gender theory in a position that insists both on a position called ‘cis’ and on a linking of that position with ‘privilege’.

The first reason to find the insistence that ‘cis’ people are privileged relative to ‘trans’ people unpersuasive is this. Identification with the gender behaviours that society insists are proper to one’s biological sex – which is what ‘cisgender’ means – is quite evidently not a ‘privilege’. It is not a ‘privilege’, for instance, to be a woman who identifies with socially sanctioned behaviours such as accepting lower pay, leaving work to take sole responsibility for children, submitting to men in every public and private sphere, and so on. It is not a ‘privilege’ to be thrown into the ridiculous performative space of gender construction, whoever you might be. It is a curse, a humiliating and degrading undergoing of ideological torture. And ‘trans’ people are actually caught up in the same struggle, not a different one, since in the same way that a straight, gay, bi, whatever individual of a ‘cis’ biological sex has to juggle the competing urges of a perceived social pressure and a personally felt desire to link body and behaviour in some acceptable sense, ‘trans’ people too are finding ways to negotiate – with more or less medical assistance – the same cultural and personal pressures. Everybody, irrespective of their body and its ‘trans’ or ‘cis’ state, is in the same boat. So the insistence that it is ‘easier’ to be ‘cis’, or that ‘cis’ people ought to pipe down a bit because they don’t understand the pain of ‘trans’ people is really not a very good argument. I wouldn’t encourage it, but it would in many ways be easier, in fact, to argue that it is ‘trans’ people, who declare their ill-fittingness with ideologically forced associations between gender and sex, who are the ‘privileged’ ones, since it is they who are resisting the ideological pressure and campaigning (as those who enter into the ‘trans’ v. ‘cis’ wars do) for a privileged status as the only position of suffering in respect of a human body. Rather than pitting ‘trans’ against ‘cis’ in the way that people who use those terms do, it would be more profitable to recognize that everyone, even those who don’t experience their relation to their gender as essentially antagonistic or traumatic, is subject to the same forces, is potentially suffering in the same way. (I sometimes hear that only ‘trans’ people suffer verbal or public abuse because of their genitals. Not true: ask any schoolboy worried about the size of his penis or any schoolgirl who is told her vagina is disgusting because she hasn’t shaved her pubes. And why are genitals more of a worry than facial birthmarks, hare-lips, etc.?)

At the very least, the battle lines that are currently drawn have the effect of producing a hierarchy of suffering in respect of gender, with one, more or less arbitrarily selected, group at the top. And within the specific confines of the difficulty experienced by every human being in respect of their gender identity, it should surely be possible to appreciate that, from outside, that insistence looks rather selfish.

The nub of the problem, as seen from the perspective of feminists outside of the circle of people who talk about ‘trans’ and ‘cis’ as a dialectical pair, is precisely this. If you are ‘cis’, then – according to the main argument that is used against ‘transphobic feminists’ – it doesn’t matter what sex, class, nationality, race, disability, etc. you have: you are de facto speaking from a position of ‘privilege’. So we can chuck Marx, or any subtle theories of ideological interpellation, of structures of power, out of the window. It is straightforward to imagine how, with little exaggeration, this blanket assertion might appear to a ‘cis’ person. It means that if you’re happy with your body, you should pipe down. That is unless, of course, you had to have surgery to reach a stage of being happy with your body. Then, even though you are now happy with your body, you’re allowed not to pipe down, because you were formerly not happy with your body. But you were formerly not happy with your body in an approved way: you were ‘trans’. If you are today, or were formerly unhappy with your body because your breasts were too small/large, your nose too small/large, and you suffered bullying among your peers or from your family or husband or whatever, but you are ‘cis’, then you are still on the piping-down side of the divide, because you are not ‘trans’. If, as ‘cis’, you change your body to conform to the expectations of the people whom you feel to be causing you pain, that is not the same as the ‘trans’ experience of changing a body to conform to personally felt pressures (however much or little those are inflected by societal pressures). ‘Trans’ people are forever on the non-piping-down side, however much or little they are anxious in the face of ideological pressures; ‘cis’ people are forever on the piping-down side, however much or little they are anxious in the face of ideological pressures: there is a hierarchy of suffering, and anybody who speaks against this hierarchy is a ‘transphobe’.

I support ‘trans’ people’s decisions in respect of the ideological gender pressures they feel, because they are equal sufferers with all of us in this particular cultural disease. There are some people who don’t support these decisions, just as there are some people who don’t support feminist or gay activism. But just as not all ‘trans’ people are misogynist (which is an accusation sometimes levelled against them), not all feminists who (a) support ‘trans’ people who want to redefine their relationship to gender and sexuality but (b) want to keep talking about the pressures that led to that decision, and that lead to more universal human suffering in respect of the same pressures – not all those people are ‘transphobic’. If we can’t talk in an open, intellectual way about the pressures that cause people to suffer, and to take action to limit the effects of that suffering wherever they can, then we are in an impoverished space. The attempt to shut down discussion by labelling it ‘phobic’ is ungenerous and contrary to belief in free speech, but it is also unhealthy.

When Suzanne Moore says that all women essentially feel the pressure to comform to the beauty ideal of a Brazilian transsexual, a response that is sensitive to the cultural pressures that she is talking about would not be, as has been seen, a harrying of her until she left Twitter under the cloud of ‘transphobic’ shame. It should be something more like this: ‘It is clear that in our society women – and men too – are essentially required to aim for a standard of beauty or of conformity to some other kind of expectation that requires high levels of bodily intervention. While some individuals may feel individually comforted by their transition into such a form, that possibility is neither open to everyone nor desirable as a universal experience. Surely we shouldn’t live in a culture which makes mere bodily existence a locus for trauma. So we should consider the cultural pressures that lead people, fairly universally, to feel demeaning pressures of this kind, and which lead people to feel the need for medical intervention to be happier inside their bodies. We should remain sympathetic in the moment of their anxiety with individuals who want to change their noses or breasts or genitals, etc., in response to these pressures, but we should consider, with them, the effects of their decisions in contributing to new forms of cultural pressure, new visions of “normality”, of which the figure of the Brazilian transexual is merely an eye-catching example.’

We should be able to have these discussions without recourse to abuse. We can be angry, by all means, but the correct focus of the anger, as Marxists and gender theorists know (and which is why I find so little of either in this debate), is the symbolic structure, the ideology, the structure of power itself, not our joint sufferers under its terrible sway. The language of ‘cis’ and ‘trans’ is bandied about simply to enable subdivisions that encourage argument. It doesn’t matter whether anyone is a ‘cis’ or ‘trans’ slave to ideologies of gender: the arbitrary separation into the two groups doesn’t change the fact that everyone is a slave – except insofar as the distraction tactic prevents the real theoretical argument, about the very arbitrariness of it all, to continue in an open and fruitful way that would be of benefit to all people.

Has capitalism done as much for gays as Pride?

 

Today the fortieth Gay Pride march takes place in London. I have a natural sympathy with protest movements and as a particularly striking and long-lived one, the gay pride movement has much to be proud of. It has, at the very least, encouraged millions of people in the West to feel comfortable about expressing sexual feelings that were, for most of the last century, subject to legal and cultural restrictions of a kind that now seem all but unimaginable. Reflecting on early chants from marches in the 1970s, Peter Tatchell says today in the Guardian:

Some of the slogans we shouted were particularly memorable: “2, 4, 6, 8! Gay is just as good as straight! 3, 5, 7, 9! Lesbians are mighty fine!” These were revolutions in consciousness, which went against the grain of virtually all of human history that designated queers as bad, sad and mad.

Let’s pass over the extravagant claim that ‘virtually all of human history’ has demonized homosexuals – a concept that only emerged in human history in the late nineteenth century. What I am more interested to wonder about is the extent to which Gay Pride has genuinely contributed to a ‘revolution in consciousness’.

I remember being a kid of about 10 or 11 in County Durham (this was the late 1980s), with regular appearances of Julian Clary on telly, reports of annual pride marches, and so on, all attracting the same conservative response from the adults around me: ‘these people are not simply not normal: they’re wicked, corrupting, horrible people’. This was a society in which it was perfectly normal for a family friend to say to me ‘You can bring home whoever you like, as long as it’s not a man!’, and there can be little doubt that the presence of openly gay figures in the mass media posed a challenge to that consciousness. But its effect on me, and I am sure many thousands of others, was not to liberate but to oppress. The freedom on show at Gay Pride events was, and to a much lesser extent these days remains, the freedom of people who are already pretty free.

I could not march in London. I could not live in London. I could not live, in economic and cultural independence, anywhere. The freedom I saw expressed in news reports seemed to me not unlike a huge list of economic and cultural freedoms enjoyed by people in other (more southerly, richer) parts of the country, who went to different (private, better achieving, better connected) schools than mine, who spoke with (posher, less comical) accents than mine, and so on. As I wondered about where I fitted on the approved list of sexualities (a list I still thought made some sense, at the time), I did not feel welcomed or encouraged at all by the state of gay protest in the 1980s. Quite the contrary: by making the expression of a non-heteronormative sexuality even more toxic, and making the people around me express their disapproval of it in such forceful terms, it seemed to me that the gay pride movement’s most striking achievement was to wake up my local surroundings to forms of human subjectivity that they weren’t aware of before, but might have been more likely to accept if they simply saw it expressed in me. The freedom of the marchers or the camp telly personalities seemed to redouble the pressure on me to conform. I was a nice boy; I would never be accepted if I became one of these monstrous individuals.

The same East Durham town I grew up in has a different feel these days. I’m not sure it’s possible for two men to walk down the street holding hands, and if it is possible for women it is only because it plays into the misogynist–heteronormative fantasy of ‘lesbians putting on a show for men’s pleasure’. Yet there is more acceptance. Same-sex couples cohabit visibly. There are gay nights in pubs in towns only a dozen miles away (not just only, as it used to be, in bigger cities like Newcastle). It certainly isn’t Shangri-La but a lot of the culturally conservative attitudes about sexuality have been moderated. Consciousness has been, to an extent, revolutionized. Did Gay Pride do that?

Actually, I think not. Elsewhere in the Guardian intervew I’ve already mentioned, Julie Bindel says some reflective things. In response to the interviewer’s question ‘Do you see Pride as a fundamentally conservative and mainstream event now, Julie? This is the criticism levelled at the movement for gay marriage, too.’, she says:

David Cameron said: ‘I don’t support gay marriage in spite of being a conservative, I support it because I’m a conservative’ – never a truer word has been said. It is the most conservative struggle we could adopt. But while I’m critical of us wasting time on it – hasn’t it brought the nasty, bigoted homophobes out of the woodwork, too? I think Pride has become both wildly hedonistic and a deeply conservative movement, with its message of “please tolerate us”. I don’t want tolerance, I want liberation.

I’ve written elsewhere on this blog about the conservatism of gay marriage. But this tension Bindel pinpoints between tolerance and liberation reveals something of the complexity of what has brought about an improvement in conditions for gay people in the West. She is right to observe not only that the drive for gay marriage contributes to the maintenance of heterosexual marriage, and is thus anti-feminist, but also that the desire to become part of a ‘normal’, stable, legalized, even religiously blessed once-for-ever romantic union is a deeply conservative thing for politically active gay people – once paragons of resistance and protest – to strive for. Tatchell too bemoans the ‘commercialization’ of Gay Pride in recent years, though it’s a commercialization he thinks can be counteracted.

But the welding together of this thing called ‘gay identity’ – the monstrous social excrescence that made my early teenage years such a secretive hell – and the need to express it through the mediation of certain specially selected commodities is the thing that, by bringing together Gay Pride and the inventiveness of capitalism, has, I suggest, produced the most significant change in consciousness. Except, of course, that it is no change in consciousness at all, ultimately: it is just an expansion of an already existing consciousness.

What Gay Pride offered at first was indeed a provocation. ‘Yes, we’re repellent, but we’re not going away, and nor need we. Your society of good manners and people knowing their place is intolerable and intolerant. It must pass. We will destroy you.’ Such truly revolutionary sentiments, a faithful response to the truth claims of emancipation for people who wish to express non-normative sexuality (whatever that might mean), were inevitably met by a strong reaction. The movement for gay marriage removes in a single gesture any claim that gay rights activists might have for seeking a revolution of the social order. The call instead is a reactive response: ‘We don’t want to overturn the dependence on traditional marriage as the basis for human social organization. We just want to slightly change the definition so that two women or two men can form such units. This will be a slightly different world but still recognizably the old one. People now have even less choice about joining in the marriage system, since whether they want to do it with the same or the other sex, they must do it.’

But Gay Pride, and the increased visibility of openly gay entertainers and public figures, also generated something of much more immediate use to capital: the association of the sexuality, and particularly I think gay male sexuality (though gay female sexuality too is partly governed by the same forces), with certain commodified expressions. Somehow it became accepted as incontrovertible fact that gay men must shop more, preen themselves more, be more sensitive about colours and fabrics, about what they eat, how they gym-tone their bodies, and so on, than straight men. The sexual identity, whose only distinguishing feature from normative sexuality is its preference for different sexual acts, has become entirely mediated by what individuals must eat or wear, what music they must buy, and so on. Homosexuality has, in short, become a marketing possibility. Hence the commercialization of Gay Pride that Tatchell disdains.

Yet by creating an economic space in which gay people can perform their ‘normal’ function as consumers, and indeed show their sophisticated understanding of the West’s dependence on senseless accumulation by buying more, and more discerningly than their straight compatriots, the commodification of sexuality has arguably done more to detoxify homosexuality than Gay Pride could ever do alone. Being gay is a new ‘normal’ not only in the sense that one of its most pressing contemporary calls is for a new form of conservative marriage, but in the sense that, as shoppers, gay people have found a way to become what Capital wants them to become: comfortably interpellated as a novelty space within the totality of commodity production and consumption. Society understands and approves purchase and the aspiration to own goods that ‘express oneself’ – i.e. do our subjective formation for us. By finding a niche, even boys and girls growing up in County Durham surely have a lifeline today that is more helpful to them than Gay Pride alone could offer.

But the sad conclusion is that the new freedom, based on endless consumption, is merely a new oppression, albeit to a slightly different master, the judgement of Capital rather than just cultural attitudes. To fight against this oppression, the gay rights movement needs some radical new ideas.

We know no one crueller

Creative Commons Licence
We know no one crueller by J. P. E. Harper-Scott is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
Based on a work at http://www.jpehs.co.uk/2012/05/21/we-know-no-one-crueller/.

In her book Richard Wagner’s Women Eva Rieger examines the presentation of feminine-gendered qualities in both female and male characters in Wagner’s operas. Her focus is on negatively construed feminine qualities, but in this TLS review I suggest that feminine characters like Isolde, Brünnhilde, and the ‘feminine’ figure of Hans Sachs all occupy the Lacanian position of the hysterical subject who sees that the irresolvable lack in their own character is reflected by the inconsistency of the big Other. Their rejection of the big Other’s limited range of ideological scripts makes them truly feminist characters, whose proposed solutions to the deadlock of modern sexual relations are so radical that we perpetually choose to cover them over with fantasies.


Review of Eva Rieger, Richard Wagner’s Women (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011). Published in the Times Literary Supplement, 18 May 2012, p. 13.

In a vital sense, women were for Wagner the chief means of achieving revolutionary change. The most obvious artistic examination of the tension between the bourgeois fantasy of marriage and Wagner’s sympathy for revolutionary overthrow of existing economic and social structures takes place in what Rieger calls ‘the feminine realm of love’.

Reminding us that intellectual, moral, and political superiority is traditionally assigned to the masculine and inferiority to the feminine, in Richard Wagner’s Women Rieger traces the presentation of masculine and feminine qualities, in stage characters of both sexes, across the operas from Rienzi to Parsifal, as a way of demonstrating Wagner’s commitment to his society’s belief in the essential link between feminine gender roles and flesh-and-blood women. Time and again the role played by women tends towards ‘sacrifice, pain and negation’, with Senta (Der fliegende Holländer) and Elisabeth (Tannhäuser) being typical cases. By contrast, those women who seek a higher political or sexual status than their sex ‘essentially’ allows them conform to the misogynist stereotype of the harridan. ‘In the whole of history we know no one crueller than the political woman’, Wagner wrote to Liszt about Ortrud in Lohengrin. Certainly no female political leader who adopted such a ‘cruel’ Wagnerian mantle could do anything but bad for women’s political representation.

Men are typically represented by strident, masterly music, or else (as often with Wotan) music of great nobility. The strong, brassy orchestration and on-stage phallic props (swords and spears abound) add to the sense of their essential and natural domination of women – whose contrastingly drooping melodic lines and softer woodwind or string accompaniment Rieger frequently highlights. Men who adopt feminine qualities are either rejected as of little account (as Erik in The Flying Dutchman, whom Senta guiltlessly rejects in favour of the more thrusting and dangerous Dutchman) or else satisfyingly killed off (Siegmund ‘must die’ because he falls too deeply into the ‘feminine’ world of love). Conversely, the wickedness of men is excused so their predominance can be maintained. For instance, Siegfried’s betrayal of Brünnhilde is forgiven because he was acting under the influence of a magic potion.

All this is astute but, as may already be obvious, Rieger seems unwilling to conceive of positive expressions of feminine-gendered qualities, and it is this failing that prevents her from answering the excellent question she poses towards the beginning: how can we love Wagner’s music despite its apparent misogyny? The answer is that, just as he does with his anti-Semitism, Wagner subverts his insupportable message at the same time as he enunciates it. Specifically, it is the stereotypically ‘feminine’ figure of the hysteric who rejects the world whom later Wagner considers the greatest and most insightful figure of all.

Hans Sachs

The central character of Die Meistersinger, Hans Sachs, is one of the most interesting of Wagner’s hysterical ‘women’, and typical of his conception of the role of the ‘feminine’ in his later work (after Das Rheingold). Rieger notes that Sachs renounces his love for Elsa in order that the younger man, Walther, can win her in the song contest (like Freia, Isolde, and Brünnhilde before her, Elsa is in important respects just an exchange-value). But while she draws out the Schopenhauerian resonance of much of late Wagner’s renunciations – that of Tristan and Isolde being only the most famous – Rieger misses the more striking fact that Wagner’s great later characters do not renounce love as such but rather the delusion that existing templates for its acting-out, which build female subjection into their core, are a guarantor of universal human happiness (‘Wahn, Wahn, überall Wahn!’, ‘Delusion, everywhere!’, is Sachs’s characteristic reflection).

Two of the last of Wagner’s ‘women’ to accede to the fantasy of stable erotic union are Siegmund and Siegfried; their ends are, significantly, shaped not by choice but by force. Isolde, Brünnhilde, and Sachs, by contrast, achieve their radically different ends by their own volition. Isolde rejects life itself as the essential framework for human suffering, but Brünnhilde goes a step further. She returns the Ring to the Rhinemaidens from whom it was stolen in the form of primordial gold, and so reverses the process by which nature was metabolized into a surplus value that sustained male power – which is to say that she destroys the capitalist economy of her world. Since, in the Ring, women are merely something to be exchanged for gold (as with Freia) or lain defenceless on a rock to be raped and taken by the first man to find them (Brünnhilde’s own fate), they function as erotic commodities, valuable insofar as they are sexually desirable to more powerful men. Having relieved Wotan of his commitment to the pursuit of social power, Brünnhilde’s final act is to throw herself, the female erotic commodity, onto the fire along with everything else. It is therefore strange for Rieger to claim that Brünnhilde achieves nothing because ‘the love of women for their men is hardly going to create a new society. On the contrary, those same men, strengthened by love, can continue their dominance – a dominance grounded on the pursuit of power.’ The world of power mediated through commodity exchange and propped up by the faithful love of women is precisely what Brünnhilde has destroyed. There can be no return of the same.

Our reluctance to swallow Wagner’s vision entirely is perhaps best illustrated by Sachs himself. Although we, like the people of Nuremberg who hail him with the last words of the opera, recognize his greatness and probably even nod sagely at his diagnosis of universal delusion, in the closing minutes Walther’s gorgeous prize song and the final choral big sing bring us ineluctably back into the presence of the fantasies that he implores us to reject. We succumb again to the surreptitious promptings of perpetual, devoted marital love, the wisdom of youth’s erotic vision, and finally the smokescreen of social cohesion that smoothes over tensions within human society (the controversial final paean to the German spirit) – knowing full well that Sachs is right about its emptiness yet nevertheless wanting to retain the psychological benefits of the fantasy. Greater sensitivity to this kind of psychological ambivalence in Wagner’s music would have made this a much more satisfactory study.

As it is, readers dismissive of feminism will doubtless find the language of ‘phallocentrism’, ‘patriarchy’, and ‘gendering’ offensive, while readers who are at home in the discourse will find the arguments a little shallow. As an introduction to how music reflects cultural assumptions about gender this book has value, but as an examination of the ways that music can criticize of those assumptions, it lacks imagination.

Black tie, reactive feminism, and gay marriage

The uniform of the imperial ruling classes

Last year I was invited to a dinner at which the dress code was black tie. It was the first time in about a decade that I’d been to one and I had a major freakout before the event. I first wore black tie when I was at university, and in that social context it was marked as something fun, just a bit of dressing up while getting ludicrously drunk. But it isn’t just fun, and I was so concerned about having to wear it last year that I vowed never to do it again.

Black tie – the coming together of a black suit with silk lapels and a black bow tie – is the uniform of the imperial ruling classes. It was formalized by the Edwardians, in a dark period of bloody imperial overreach (rather like the one we live in now, under the American empire). When we read those two words, ‘black tie’, on an invitation, we should be aware of its undertones: only men count (women’s dress isn’t specified, though they’re expected to wear something that emphasizes their bodies), and the rigid separation of men and women is to be insisted on with full ideological force in a performance of separation into intellect (men, all blandly and identically dressed, so that the qualities of their mind in their conversation can be observed the more keenly) and body (women, there to simper, delight, and arouse). It is no more politically neutral to slip into black tie than it is to have a Brits-and-Zulus party with pith helmets. Continue reading

Abortion, Wagnerian heroes, and the body of the Other

Siegmund and Sieglinde (illustration by Arthur Rackham)

The House of Commons voted this week to reject an amendment by Nadine Dorries MP to the Health and Social Care Bill 2011, which could have had the effect of limiting women’s right to abortion by redoubling the social pressure against their decision. It is only one news story this week in which people’s decisions about what to do with themselves bodily was brought into focus. It has two unlikely bedfellows in the Scottish newspapers: Continue reading

Amy Winehouse, addiction, and the pity of capitalism

Amy Winehouse

The extraordinary response to the early death this weekend of Amy Winehouse reveals the extent of the affection in which she – and her music  – were held. But her life and public engagement with it says equally sorrowful things about life under capitalism, under whose ideological pressure we are all addicts. Continue reading

Can Google Books Ngram Viewer help students learn theory?

Google’s latest search gizmo, the Google Books Ngram Viewer, allows users to make statistical graphs of word usage in books from its digitized collection between 1500 and 2008. The metadata attached to Google Books – the publication year and other things (including the text of the books themselves) is unreliable, as this study shows, but with that caveat in mind the scholarly and teaching potential of the new Ngram Viewer isn’t negligible.

I inputted some simple words related to sexuality to see what came up. Of course scholars in the humanities, who are aware of the work of Michel Foucault, know that sexuality is a medical invention of the late nineteenth century, so the appearance of this graph, which shows instances of the words homosexual(ity), bisexual(ity), heterosexual(ity), and sexuality itself between 1700 and 2008 isn’t surprising.

Google Ngram of sexuality words. Click for full size image.

Continue reading